In addition to the differences in the decision environment and decision rules, our analysis is also somewhat different from most of the previous literature in its focus on a categorization of the dynamic pattern of the market shares of the two choices. We begin with the case where the average payoffs are identical. Here we distinguish two possibilities. If all consumers eventually make the same choice (formally, if the market share of one choice converges to one), we say that the population exhibits "conformity." If instead the market shares perpetually fluctuate or settle down to a nontrivial split, we say that the population exhibits diversity. Our main conclusion, presented in Section IV, is that sufficiently limited word-of-mouth communication results in conformity. When players receive more information, i.e., when N is large, the system exhibits diversity.
In the case where the choices have unequal payoffs, we distinguish three possible patterns of behavior. First, as before, the population may exhibit diversity. Second, we may have efficient social learning with everyone adopting the superior choice. Finally, there is "inefficient herding" if everyone eventually adopts the same choice but the common choice is not necessarily optimal.
To understand how these regions arise, it is instructive to think of the superior average payoff as a force pushing all players toward using the better choice. The long-run behavior of the system is then determined by how this force combines with the word-of-mouth process's "inherent" favoring of conformity or diversity. When the sample size N is large, we show in Section V that the diversity forces are overwhelming, and the first case obtains. When N is smaller, there is efficient social learning, as a not too strong tendency toward diversity and the superior payoff combine to prevent convergence to the inferior extreme while allowing convergence to the superior extreme. For some parameter values, very small N produces inefficient herding. We find, however, that this behavior is rare when significant inertia is present, as it may be that even N = 1 is large enough to produce efficient learning.
To assess the robustness of our conclusions, we examine two related models in Section VI. In the first variant, players practice popularity weighting, combining information about payoffs that they obtain from their samples with information about overall market shares. We find that the same basic patterns of behavior occur, although efficient social learning may now require that the players see larger samples. Our second variant supposes that the common shock to the system changes more frequently than any individual player observes the system, so that when information is obtained about someone's most recent experience it may reflect the payoffs of a previous date. In this way, we think of the players' sampling process as taking advantage of a social memory of past payoffs. This might be expected to give a clearer advantage to the product which is better on average, and possibly make larger samples more efficient. In examining the extreme cases of two period and infinite memories, we find that sampling only one other player is still efficient, but note that learning may be nearly efficient with large sample sizes as well.
II. THE MODEL
We examine word-of-mouth communication and social learning in the context of a population of agents who are faced with a choice between two competing products, technologies, or practices, which we label f and g. There is a continuum of identical agents, and each chooses between the two products at a discrete set of points in time, t = 1,2,3....
The aggregate behavior of the population at each point in time can be summarized by a "state" variable xt, giving the fraction of the population who are using technology g. Our model does not attempt to explain the very first adoptions of a new technology. Rather, we take the initial state x0 to be exogenous, and focus on the social learning reflected in the subsequent patterns of the market share movements.
The specification of the payoffs provided by the products incorporates a number of elements which complicate decisionmaking in technology adoption problems. We assume that the payoff to consumer i using brand f at date t is ft + Eift, and that i's payoff to using brand g at date t is gt + Eigt. Here the Ei.t represent player-specific idiosyncratic shocks, which could correspond to variations both in the quality of individual units of the product, and its suitability for the consumer in question. (For example, they may reflect both whether a restaurant meal is well cooked, and whether the customer ordered the right entree given the way he is feeling on a particular day.) We suppose that the Ei.t are i.i.d. both over time and across consumers, which implies that there are no persistent differences between individuals.2 For computational 98 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS convenience we further assume that each E has a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation a.
Common shocks, i.e., factors affecting the relative payoffs of the two products for all consumers, are represented by allowing ot =---ft to be random. We assume that the Ot are also i.i.d. and independent of the individual specific shocks, and that the marginal distribution over Ot is binomial, with probabilityp, 0 < p < 1, that Ot = 0 > 0, and probability 1 -p that Ot = -0 < 0.3 The common shocks might reflect the impact of weather conditions on two agricultural technologies, the different effect of changing economic conditions on firms who have chosen one of two business practices, or variation in the quality of the designs that two firms produce in a given model year.
Given the distribution of the shocks, the probability that g is better than f for player i at date t is p Prob(Eigt -Eift > -0) +
(1 -p) Prob(Eigt -Eift > 0). Note that even if p = 1, so that at each time t brand g has a higher expected payoff, the probability that g does better than f for a given individual may be less that one due to the idiosyncratic shocks. Note also that this formulation places no restriction on the distributions of the mean payoffs ft and -, but only on their difference which allows for the possibility that the quality of both products is increasing over time. The individual means will not matter until we consider an extension of the model in subsection VI.2.
In choosing between the two alternatives, the agents in our model are assumed to follow exogenously specified, boundedly rational behavior rules that incorporate the notions that there is inertia in consumer choices, and that consumers use the information gathered by word-of-mouth communication in a simple way, without the explicit considerations of the information they would see in each possible state of the world that is required in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Inertia is modeled with the assumption that, at each date t > 0, some fraction a, 0 < a < 1, of the agents decide to reevaluate their choice.4 When agents do reevaluate their choice, they ask N other individuals chosen at random from the population distribu-3. The assumed symmetry between payoffs in the good and bad state reduces the number of cases we must discuss but does not significantly change our qualitative conclusions. 4. A more realistic model would specify that consumers are more likely to switch if they are dissatisfied with their current choice; that is, if their current payoff is low. 99 tion about their current choice and current payoff. The sampling agents then compute the average payoff of the two alternatives in their sample, and choose whichever one had the higher average payoff. This extremely simple decision rule ignores both the precise stochastic structure of the payoffs, and the implicit information that may be conveyed by the relative popularity of the two choices. Consequently, it may be more plausible in complex and novel environments.
Several aspects of this rule deserve emphasis. First, a player who is currently using one choice cannot switch to the other one unless he talks to someone who is using it. As remarked above, this implies that the system incorporates a form of "popularity weighting," where the weight is decreasing in N. Second, players weigh observations of other players' experience as heavily as they weight their own. Since the individual-specific shocks are assumed to be i.i.d., this behavior is consistent with the model, and the more plausible case where one's experience is more relevant corresponds to a model with persistent individual shocks. Third, customers use only current information in making decisions. The lack of information on other agents' past payoffs may be justified by saying that agents simply do not pay attention to others' casual comments about products they are not considering buying at the time. The agents' failure to incorporate their own past experience is harder to justify fully, although it is perhaps not unreasonable, for example, for consumers facing a choice between computers or other products for which mean quality levels change so rapidly that it is hard to compare the quality of products purchased at different times. To a degree, we use this extreme assumption simply to capture the idea that boundedly rational consumers will not fully incorporate all historical information.
Our analysis of the model focuses on the dynamic pattern of the market shares of the two products over time. Since the aggregate shock Ot takes on only two values, and we have supposed that the aggregate distribution of idiosyncratic shocks over the continuum of consumers is deterministic, there are only two possible values of x,+1 for each value of x. For example, when N = 1, the evolution of the system is given by where q+ is the probability that a randomly drawn g-user had a higher payoff than a randomly drawn f-user when Ot = 0, and q -is the analogous term when Ot = -0.
To understand the top line of this equation, suppose that Ot = 0. Recall first that each period a fraction (1 -a) of the consumers do not consider switching. Since a fraction xt of these are currently using g, there will be at least (1 -a)xt consumers using g next period. Of the a consumers who do consider switching, three subsets choose g with positive probability. Those who use g and meet another g-user choose g with probability one, while those who use g and meet an f-user and those who use f and meet a g-user both choose g with probability q +. Multiplying these probabilities by the corresponding masses, which are oax', oaxt(l -xt), and oixt(l -xt), respectively, yields the top line of equation (1) 
III. LOCK-ON AND HERDING: A LOCAL ANALYSIS
We have not been able to completely determine the long-run dynamics of our model. Rather than simplify the model further, we have chosen to provide a partial characterization. In particular, our results concern only the question of whether the system will converge to one of its endpoints, in which case we will say that it exhibits "lock-on" or "herding," or whether to the contrary there will be long-run diversity in the sense that both choices continue to be used by nonnegligible fractions of the population.
A great practical advantage of this sort of characterization is that it only requires a local analysis of the system in the neighborhood of its endpoints. In this section we temporarily defer any discussion of our word-of-mouth learning model to present a mathematical result which greatly simplifies such analyses. Essentially, the lemma shows that when one is trying to determine whether a member of a class of Markov processes can converge to an extreme point, one can work instead with a linearized version of the system. Given the complexity of our model, the ability to work with a linear approximation will be an advantage. 
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Remark. The proof is deferred to Appendix A; the following discussion tries to provide an intuition. Since this lemma concerns approximately linear systems, the best way to understand it is to first understand the case of systems that are exactly linear. Such systems are sufficient to make a crucial point: when the step size is proportional to the state, as it is in the models of this paper, the appropriate notion of "negative drift" to use for determining whether the system converges to zero is not the usual supermartingale condition that E(xt+1 Ixt) < xt, but rather that the log of the system has negative drift; that is, that E(log (xt+1) Ixt) < log (xt). In particular, a system with positive drift in the usual sense can still be certain to converge to zero. This explains the role of the logarithms in the various expression in our theorems.
To see why this is so, consider the case where x, is a Markov process on [0,) and the functions Hi are exactly linear, so that Hi(x) = yix. Let Zt = log (xt), and note that if xt --0, then Zt oo.
Moreover, the evolution of zt is given by IZt + log (y1) with probp Zt+il Zt + log (Y2) with prob 1-p so that Zt is the sum of the i.i.d. increments log (-yl) and log (Y2), with probabilities p and 1 -p, respectively. If p log (-yl) + (1 -p) log (Y2) = log (YP7Y2-P) > 0, then by the strong law of large numbers Zt converges to oo with probability 1, and hence xt converges to oo, which is the basis of the proof of (a) and (c). If p log (-yl) + (1 -p) log (y2) < 0, then by the strong law Zt converges to -oo, and so xt converges to 0, which is the basis of the proof of (b).
Once the analysis of the linear system is understood, it remains to explain why the linear approximation methods we use are valid. Basically, if the log has negative drift, then not only does the exactly linear system converge to zero, there is a positive probability that it will converge without ever moving to the right of its initial position. Along such paths the error in ignoring terms of higher order in x is bounded, and we can conclude that the approximately linear system converges to zero as well.
To conclude this section, we return to our model to give the linearized form of its dynamics, which is To understand these equations intuitively, note that in period t + 1 the number of g-users will consist of the (1 -a)xt who previously used g and did not consider switching, plus a fraction of those who did consider switching. When xt is near zero, the number of players who considered switching and observed both choices f and g is a(N + 1)xt to first order in x. (This is the sum of almost all of the g-users who consider switching, who have mass oixt plus a share Nxt of the a(1 -xt) f-users who consider switching.) The sample of each of these players most likely consists of one g-user and N f-users. With such a sample, the probability that the average payoff to g is higher than the average payoff to f is q + (N) or q -(N) depending on the realization of the common shock.
Lemma 1 shows that this approximation can be used to determine the behavior in the neighborhood of zero. Roughly speaking, the true system has positive probability of converging to zero if and only if the system in (2) has positive probability of converging to zero.
IV. CONFORMITY VERSUS DIVERSITY WITH Two EQUALLY EFFICIENT CHOICES
This section begins our analysis of word-of-mouth learning by examining the special case in which p = 1/2, so that the payoffs to the two choices have the same distribution, and hence are equally efficient.5 Hence there is nothing for the players to learn, although the players do not realize this. By abstracting from the forces that favor the adoption of a superior product, this simple model allows 5. Note that the mean payoffs to the two choices still fluctuate-the two choices have the same ex ante mean but one or the other can do better ex post in a given period. us to highlight the effect of learning rules in determining when a market is likely to be dominated by a single product, practice, or technology. Also, the simplicity of this case makes it a useful introduction to the more general analysis of the next section.
Theorem 1 below shows that the system exhibits conformity when players gather very little information, and exhibits diversity when the word-of-mouth communication is more extensive. To understand the mechanism behind this result, it helps to note first that when each player talks to exactly one other player, there will be equally many players using f who hear about g and using g who hear about f. Given the symmetry of the payoffs, the popularity ofg will thus move up or down in equal increments depending on the realization of the common shock. For example, when g is unpopular, the dynamics might dictate that g will either decrease in popularity by 50 percent or increase in popularity by 50 percent. Because (1/2)(3/2) = 3/4 < 1, the system has negative "log drift" in the sense explained in the previous section, and so such dynamics imply that unpopular actions tend to die out.
In contrast, when players obtain more word-of-mouth information, unpopular technologies tend to make comebacks. Suppose that g is very unpopular and the sample size N is large. While nearly all g-users who consider switching in a given period will see an f-user, the size of this group will still be small. Because the number of f-users is much larger, there will be many more f-users who hear about g than vice versa. Hence, favorable draws of the common shock obtained by g-users will cause a large number of players to switch to g, while unfavorable draws will cause only a few players to switch away from g. As a result, unpopular technologies will not die out, and the system will exhibit diversity. Hence if {xtj does not converge to an endpoint, then with probability one there must be a T such thatxt E (x',1 -x') for all t > T. But for all xt in this interval, the state can move to some xt < x' in a finite number of steps, and the probability that this occurs is bounded away from zero. Thus, by theorem 9.5.2 of Chung, there is probability zero that the state remains in (x ',1 -x') infinitely often without making infinitely many transitions to the region [O,x'], and so the set A must be empty. N* (a) , the system converges to a state of conformity, where all consumers use the same product. Intuitively, the fewer other consumers each consumer samples, the less likely the consumer is to observe and then adopt a product with a small market share, so that when N is small a product with a very small share will tend to be driven from the market. If N lies above this curve, the state does not converge (provided that 0 > 0), so that the market shares are always changing, and do not approach a state where one product captures the entire market. exists and is unique.7) If N > N (which is about 40 when N = 2 and about 5 when q = 1), then not only does the system not converge to conformity, it never even enters a neighborhood of a state where everyone uses the same product. This is because, when N is this large, the state moves toward the center when it is near an endpoint, even if the common shock favors the more prevalent choice. This occurs because the support of the idiosyncratic noise is large enough that, even when the common shock favors product g, some users of product f will receive payoffs that exceed that period's mean payoff to g, and those g-users whose only observation of f is favorable will switch, so each f-user who receives a favorable draw will cause Ng-users to switch. As shown in Theorem 1, N * (a) is increasing in a. The intuition for this is that the system is more likely to lock on when it takes large jumps; and so as a increases larger N's become consistent with the system locking on to a state of conformity.
In this simple case of equally efficient choices, we can also determine the relationship between the relative sizes of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, as measured by aj, and the tendency for the system to exhibit conformity or diversity. When there are only common shocks, (a = oo), we have q+(N) _ 1 and q-(N) 0, so that N*((a) = 1/(1 -a). When q is very small, so the idiosyncratic shocks dominate, q + and q -are both approximately 1/2, and so N* (a) is slightly greater than 1 for all a. These two curves are graphed in Figure II , along with the previously displayed curve for 9 = 2. Note that the long-run behavior of the system is independent of r when a is small: the system then exhibits conformity for N = 1, and diversity for N ? 2.
The conclusion that, with substantial inertia, conformity obtains only for the extreme case of N = 1 might seem to indicate that conformity is unlikely, at least absent an efficiency explanation. Yet even this degree of conformity may be surprising, given that players have no memory and always gravitate toward the choice which did better in the previous period. Our interpretation of this result is that the combination of limited word-of-mouth communication and our implicit "must-see-to-use" assumption generate a tendency toward conformity that is not present when players sample more broadly. Appendix 2 shows that aQ*(a,N*(a))/ar < 0, so as the importance of the common shocks increases, the system converges to uniformity for a larger set of parameter values. This should be fairly intuitive: because both choices are equally good, in the absence of a common shock there is no force that favors one choice over the other. Indeed, in the extreme case q = 0 where common shocks are absent, the system is deterministic, and converges to x = 1/2 for any N ? 2. (For N = 1 the system becomes xt+i = xt.)
V. PAYOFF-RELEVANT CHOICES AND EFFICIENT SOCIAL LEARNING
We now turn our attention to the diffusion of unequal technologies. In contrast to the situations studied in the previous section, the long-run outcome here may have substantial efficiency consequences. Technological change has generally been regarded as accounting for a significant fraction of growth, and we believe that models of learning may help explain why the diffusion of innovations has so often been found to be slow and incomplete. 8 We now refine conformity into two subcategories: we will say that a population exhibits inefficient herding if in the long run everyone uses the inferior technology, and that it exhibits "efficient social learning" if in the long run everyone uses the superior choice.
Formally, we examine here the general model of Section II for the case ofp > 1/2, so that technology g is superior in the sense that it is better more than half of the time. For example, this superior technology could take the form of a new agricultural practice that outperforms the old one for a wide range of weather conditions, or a new management practice that is superior for a large set of economic conditions.
The behavior of our model is most easily understood by thinking of the diffusion process as being affected by two forces. First, the fact that g is better more often tends to make g grow in popularity, although given the players' inability to aggregate information, this force is of limited strength. Second, we have the tendency of word-of-mouth communication to produce conformity or diversity depending on the number of "friends" that the agents contact. As we will see, these forces can combine to produce efficient social learning despite the naive behavior we have assumed at the individual level. This occurs when the tendency of limited word-of-mouth communication to produce conformity is sufficiently strong so that in combination with the force of superior payoffs it allows g to dominate, while at the same time the tendency for conformity is too weak to allow inefficient herding on f.
Theorem 2 provides a complete characterization of the behavior of the model. In general, all three behaviors are possible. As we will see later, however, the model typically exhibits diversity when the word-of-mouth communication is extensive, and efficient social learning when players receive less information. Q(a,N) , the system exhibits inefficient herding: the state converges to an endpoint with probability one, and converges to everyone using the inferior productf with positive probability from all initial conditions. Q(a,N) , the system exhibits diversity, as the state does not converge to either endpoint. Moreover, if q ? 0, the system does not converge to any deterministic limit; more precisely, Prob(3x s.t. xt -> x) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. , there is probability bounded away from zero that xt increases in every period until it reaches a state greater than or equal to xE, and the number of steps in this transition is finite. Hence whenever the system is below xE, it has positive probability of passing above it; and each time it does so, it has probability at least E of converging to 1. Hence from Theorem 9.5.4 of Chung [1974] , the system converges to 1 almost surely. Looking at Figure III , in the top region where N > N(a) the system exhibits diversity, as before. In the bottom region, where N < N(a), the system exhibits conformity or "two-sided herding," with the state eventually converging to one of the endpoints, and both endpoints having positive probability of being selected. This behavior is much like the conformity case of the previous section; the one new feature is that the state can converge to the inferior choice. However, unlike in the previous section, this two-sided herding cannot occur for very small values of a as now N < N(a) may require that N < 1: when f, say, is an inferior choice, there is a smaller set of parameter values where the state can converge to f.
The most novel aspect of Figure III is the intermediate region  where N(a) < N < N(a) . Here the system exhibits a form of efficient social learning, in the sense that all of the agents eventually adopt and stick with the superior product. Intuitively, because players using a word-of-mouth decision rule are unlikely to switch to an unpopular product (at least if N is not too large), the state has a tendency to be absorbed by an endpoint whenever a neighborhood of that endpoint is reached. A payoff difference between the products provides an additional force favoring the superior choice, which increases the probability of converging to the superior choice, and can reduce or eliminate the probability of converging to the opposite, inferior, extreme. Figure IV illustrates the way the three regions change as p increases from 0.55 to 0.70, again with q = 2. As seen in the figure,  increasing p increases p/(1 -p) , which shifts the curve N down, and decreases (1 -p)/p, which shifts the curve N up. Thus, the "efficient learning region" N(a) < N < N(a) where the state converges to the better choice increases, and the two other regions both shrink.
Three properties of the efficient learning region are worth noting. First, the curve N*(a) of the previous section (which corresponds to p = 1/2) lies within the efficient learning region for any p > 1/2, and indeed N = N*(a) is the unique value of N which leads to the efficient choice for all values of p. We will therefore refer to sampling N* (a) people as the uniformly optimal rule. Second, N(a) is less that 1 when a is not too large, where "too large" is 0.2 forp = 0.55 and increases inp. Since N(a) > N*(a) > 1, N = 1 leads to efficient learning for a wide range of a's provided that the two choices are not too similar.10
Third, Q (a,N) < (1 -p)/p for all N > N, where N is the number defined in the last section such that N > N implies the state moves toward the center with probability one when it is sufficiently near the endpoints. Hence, the curve provides an upper bound on the efficient learning region which is independent of p. When N exceeds this level, the forces that prevent convergence are strong enough to prevent efficient learning even if one technology is always better than the other; i.e., if its mean payoff is better with probability one.11
The long-run dynamics of this model are fairly similar to those in the model with explicit popularity weighting we considered in our earlier paper [Ellison and Fudenberg 1993] , where players were assumed to be less willing to switch to an unpopular choice. In that model, as in this one, there are three regions of parameter space. With very little popularity weighting, the system oscillates, 
VI. MORE COMPLEX DECISION RULES
To test the robustness of our qualitative conclusions, we now consider two more complex variants of the word-of-mouth decision rule.
Popularity Weighting
The first variant we consider supposes that players use popularity weighting of the kind we considered in Ellison and Fudenberg [1993] : players who observe the average payoffs tg and 4tf chose g if Ot -V > m(1 -2xt). Note that this rule supposes that agents observe the aggregate popularity xt in the entire population, but learn the payoffs of the agents they talk to directly. This seems plausible to us, as popularity is easier to communicate than a level of satisfaction, and also may be well proxied by the consumer's observations of, e.g., the relative numbers of different brands of cars on the road to work.
Intuitively, popularity weighting increases the forces favoring convergence to an endpoint, and so should increase the set of parameters for which convergence occurs. Thus, beginning from a situation of no popularity weighting, i.e., m = 0, a small increase in m, holding N constant, should increase the efficiency of the system if (a,N) lies just above the curve N that determines the upper boundary of the optimal learning region, and an increase in m with N constant should decrease the long-run efficiency of the system starting at a point (a,N) that lies just above the curve N that determines the lower boundary of the optimal learning region. Moreover, a nonnegligible amount of popularity weighting could shift the curve N up enough so that it lies above the point (0,1), reversing our conclusion that N = 1 is optimal when the inertia is 12. But, unlike the previous paper, this case may not arise if a is small. III.) Note that with popularity weighting in this example, the optimal sample size N is about three. The one qualitative change caused by popularity weights is that for small N and large enough m the system is certain to lock on to the nearest endpoint whenever it starts out sufficiently close to it.
WORD-OF-MOUTH

Infrequent Sampling and Social Memory
In the models we have considered so far, word-of-mouth sampling generated information on the performance of the various choices in the previous period. These models thus implicitly supposed that the N players each agent sampled have all observed the payoffs in the previous period, presumably because they themselves had used the products then. As a further check on the robustness of our conclusions, we now consider a model in which individuals observe the payoffs less frequently, so that the individuals in an agent's sample may report observations from a number of different past periods, and the sampling process incorporates a form of "social memory" that can reduce the effect of the common shocks. This social memory might be expected to give a clearer advantage to the product that is better on average, as it reduces the probability that unrepresentative draws push the system in the wrong direction. Social memory might also be expected to make larger sample sizes more efficient than in the model without social memory, where large sample sizes preclude fully efficient social learning. Without social memory a large sample can still be misleading due to an unrepresentative value of the common shock, but a large sample with a large social memory should lead almost all of the agents to choose the better action. As we will see, both of these intuitions are essentially correct.
Allowing for social memory requires players to compare payoffs to fin one period with those tog in another. For this reason, we find it easiest to specialize the distribution of payoffs so that the common shock affects the payoffs to f andg symmetrically. That is, we suppose that g = Ot/2, ft = Ot/2.
We begin with the case of a two-period social memory. For simplicity, we assume that a fraction a of the players consider switching every other period. This leads to a Markov process with three realizations for the common shocks, 0, 1, and 2, corresponding to the number of times the common shock took on the value 0 in the previous two periods. In a neighborhood of x = 0, the system This system takes on a particularly simple form if N = 1, for then in realization 1 the system does not move. (To see why, note that there are just as many f-players who observe g-players as g-players who observe f-players, and that in realization 1, the probability that one draw of g beats one draw of f is 1/2.) The same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2 show that there is efficient social learning with p > 1/2 if p2/(l -p)2 > Q(aL,1) > (1 -p)2/p2, which is the previous condition with p2 replacingp, and (1 -p)2 replacing (1 -p). Since this is a weaker condition, N = 1 will still yield efficient social learning provided that a is not too large.
With larger sample sizes, the behavior of the model is more complicated, because it is no longer true that the system remains constant (xt+l = xt) following the realization of one draw of each value of the shock. For instance, with very large samples, almost all players will have both f-users and g-users in their samples, and since in realization 1 the payoffs off and g are drawn from the same distribution, half of these players will adopt each technology.13 This provides an additional force favoring diversity, instead of the null transition that occurs in state 1 when N = 1. For this reason, it is no longer necessarily true that efficient learning occurs for any parameter values that yield efficient learning with one-period social memory, and indeed we have found examples where increasing social memory from 1 to 2, holding other parameters constant, causes long-run behavior to switch from efficient learning to diversity. However, increasing the social memory cannot allow inefficient herding to occur when it would not occur previously.14 13. Remember that the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks is normal and so is symmetric.
14. For the special case of two-period social memory, we can show that the long-run outcome is as if the regions shown in Figure III are shifted down, so that Now we turn to the limit case of an infinite social memory, which we model by supposing that the distribution of experience in the population is deterministic, with a fraction p of the g-users having experience based 0+ and fraction (1 -p) having experience based on 0. Hence the aggregate system is deterministic and its evolution is given by This expression will be less than 1/2 if the (weighted) average of the first and third term is less than 1/2. Because p2 < (1 -p)29 FD(0/ov2) > 1/2, and the fact that the unweighted average of these two terms is 1/2, this is true. Hence under infinite social memory N = 1 yields efficiency for any value of the inertia parameter a, while N = 1 and large a can lead to inefficient herding without social memory. Intuitively, the social memory averages out the unrepresentative draws that can otherwise lead to inefficient herding when ao is large.
some parameters that previously corresponded to inefficient herding lead to efficient learning, and some parameters that corresponded to efficient learning lead to diversity. The calculations are available on request.
